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INTRODUCTION
You must change your life.
~RAINER MARIA RILKE

The central theme of this book is authority, an old topic in philosophy that is rather newer
to art history. In what follows, I explain its application to problems Pablo Picasso and his
associates raise. Simply put, my argument is that Picasso and a number of the artists and
writers who were important to him by about 1905 were deeply engaged with the problem
of authority. They included Paul Gauguin, Paul Verlaine, Eugene Carriere, Santiago
Rusinol, Guillaume Apollinaire, and the symbolist poet and critic Charles Morice. I say
more about some than about others, but each has something important to contribute.
Ultimately, authority is a problem not only for those I have just mentioned, but for all of
us-interpreters, critics, and historians of art and literature-as a ramification of our
own methodological problems.
So this is not a book about Picasso (or about Picasso and Apollinaire or about art and
literature in Paris or Barcelona around 1900) in a common sense. I do not pretend to
outdo or surpass the researchers I mention throughout this work, in my knowledge of
either Picasso's or Apollinaire's works or their historical circumstances. I am humbled by
the work ofthose-Atme I3aldassari, Laurence Campa, Robert Couffignal, Elizabeth Cowling, Michel Decaudin, Daniel Delbreil, Marilyn McCully, Phoebe Pool, Peter Read, John
Richardson, William H. Robinson, William Rubin, and others-who have dedicated their
lives to the bodies of work I consider and have made arguments like this one possible.
Rather than reveal new information about the fin-de-siccle world in which Picasso and
Apollinaire worked, or offer a new set of interpretations-although those are important
things to do, and I do some of both-or challenge the thoughtful conclusions ofmy peers

and predecessors, I am concerned to give a sense of the problem of authority, in its n'.ultiple manifestations, in (mid- to) late nineteenth-century culture, mostly in France. Domg
nd
so entails explaining the connection of that problem to other problems, not just in art a
literature but also (of all things) in theology. Further, I show how closely the theological
versions of the problem were connected to the artistic versions and how well represented
both versions were in the milieux where the young Picasso came of age.
Although I discuss one major work of Picasso's in this introduction, I return to a sustained discussion ofhis oeuvre only in my final chapter. Nor do I touch the regular bases of
art-historical discussions, such as influence or sources, considered in the usual way. Picasso's debts or responses to El Greco, Toulouse-Lautrec, Steinlcn, Puvis de Chavanncs, Degas,
and so forth, are major themes in the existing Picasso literature, where they arc treated
admirably. I mention such connections only where they are relevant to my point-partly
because they have been discussed elsewhere, but also because the connections with other
artists I discuss differ from "sources" in the usual sense. Carriere was not a particularly
important source for Picasso-he was certainly less important than, say, El Greco. I argue
that Carriere was a historically important figure with connections to people close to Picasso,
so that understanding Carriere's achievement as they did means understanding his relation
to certain problems (divided or compound selves and the notion ofa nondivine jr!s11s l1011wir:,
to name just two) to which Picasso was also reacting, although that reaction was a critical
retort to the sensibilities of Carriere and his ilk. This amounts to saying that both Carriere
and, for example, Gauguin were important for Picasso in the years I discuss here, but it is
not to say that Carriere's paintings were as important for Picasso as Gauguin's.
Whereas features of Gauguin's paintings were important sources for Picasso's paintings-I point out such things as the floating effect of feet in both painters' works and
suggest that Picasso's play with the thickness or thinness of paint mass may have been
inspired by Gauguin's-nonetheless, Gauguin's thought and Picasso's interest in the
conception of art and the religious feeling it represents arc more fundamental matters
for my argument.
Finally, my readings of Picasso's paintings aim, ultimately, not to explain what those
paintings are "about," as many readings do, whether one wants to call them iconographic
or biographical or political or social-historical. I have no objection to such readings; I just
do not have highly developed accounts of what these pictures arc of and am skeptical
about the prospects for detailed referential readings of the paintings that interest 111e
most. Indeed, my purpose here is to argue that attention to what Picasso's paintings rckr
to, whether one seeks readings based in iconography, sources, and biography or opposes
such procedures, goes only so far. Strange though it may seem to say, we may have more
luck understanding these paintings ifwe think about the problems they pose rather than
try to solve those problems.
To explain what that means and to give at least a sense of where I am headed, I look
now at an important work of Picasso's that can also illustrate some of the issues I disrnss.

La vie (plate r) is surely one of Picasso's most important and famously inscrutabll' pie-
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tures. I say it is inscrutable, but on one level, that is not exactly true. It is generally
accepted that the male figure at left resembles Carles Casagemas, Picasso's close friend,
who committed suicide sometime before Picasso started the picture, and whose death
then became a theme in Picasso's art. 1 Beside him is a nude female figure that has been
taken to represent Germaine, the young woman who was Casagernas's love at the time
of his death, and whom he tried to shoot when he took his own life. On the right is the
figure of a woman holding a baby, another stock feature of Picasso's Blue-period pictures.
Given the presence ofCasagemas and ofa baby, the picture seems inescapably to oppose
the two figure groups as embodiments of life and death, or some similar and similarly
allegorical pair of meanings. Between the two figure groups are two pictures that bear a
generic resemblance to Picasso's work of the time. 2
But it is hard to be more specific than that. Perhaps that is because Picasso does not
supply enough iconographic specificity or fixity to let us go further confidently. For example, the figure of Casagemas was first painted with a head that resembles Picasso's.
Preparatory drawings show the same Picasso-like features, in some cases with an older,
male figure at the right in the mother's place (fig. 1). The older man holds a palette, like
a painter. It may even be Santiago Rusifiol, as William H. Robinson has suggested (Robinson, Picasso a11d t/1e Mystaies of Lije, 96). If so many elements-indeed, the central
elements-of the allegory were in flux until the project itself was far advanced, how
should we think of Picasso's mea11i11g? 1 Can we say that he had in mind an idea, a theme,
which he conceived first with his head 011 the left-hand figure and an old painter in opposition at the right, but that in the course of executing that image, it occurred to him that
his point might be better expressed if Casagwrns's head and the figure of a yo1111g 111otlier
were to occupy those places? What point might that even conceivably be? If Picasso
changed the painting's meaning drastically by altering only a few details, his move does
less to put in place the new meaning (about which we are still unsure) than to show how
loosely that meaning adheres to its form.
John Richardson's highly informative and believable interpretation of the painting,
open-ended as it is in many respects, is striking for its breadth, its erudition, and its
sensitivity. Even so, it hardly seems like a specific answer to one's desire to know what
the painting is about. In the end, it leaves us more or less where we began. Richardson
argues convincingly that Picasso uses tarot and other esoteric symbolism, references to
intimates like Casagrn1as and Germaine, "echoes of the expulsion of Adam and Eve from
Paradise," echoes of Gauguin's

D'oi'1 11,:11011s-11011s? Q11i:

so111111cs-11011s? 011 allo11s-11011s?

(fig. 2), and the trope of the studio as "Theatrurn Mundi"-all to get us from Alfred Barr's
"Obviously allegory is intended" to Richardson's own "It certainly poses [ ... ] nebulous
and unanswerable questions" (Richardson,

LUc 1fl'iumo. 270-75).

But I do not mean to criticize Richardson. Far from objecting to his procedure, I
applaud him for leaving the painting's iconography more richly read and also for recognizing that it remains, for all his work, unresolved. Elizabeth Cowling's reading ranges at
least as freely as Richardson's and produces an alternative set of speculations that likewise
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FIGURE 2

Paul Ga uguin , Wli~ r~ Do We Come From ? W/1111 Arc We ? W/1.;re Mc We Going?, 1897- 98. Museum of'
Fine Ar ts, Boston.

serves to provoke th e reader's wondering. Cowlin g notes the diffi cu lty of "interpretin g [La
vie's] opaque iconography sati sfactoril y" and adm its that "despite sustain ed attempts by
di stin gu ished sc holars th ere is little co nse nsus" about the wo rk's all egori cal mea nin g:1
She refers to the late shi ft from Pi casso's features to Casage mas's and from the old painter
to th e wo man with baby and to speculation that th e pi cture may be "'a bout' Pi casso's
Oed ipal conflict with hi s painter-fath er" or about "th e in compatibili ty of sexual love and
parenth ood" (Cowling,

102 ).

Further, notin g the final form of th e picture, with Casagemas

and the woman with child , Cowlin g proposes oth er possibiliti es : th at the pi cture is "a
solemn follow-up to the irreve rent, 1nock ing Burial of Casagenws," or an all egory on a
th eme li ke the "Th ree Ages of Man ," or "Life and Dea th" (apropos of th e latter, she remarks
that th e baby does not look hea lthy or eve n obviously alive , and th e woman who hold s it
"looks like a revcnanl "), or "Adam and Eve aft er the f al l" (Cowlin g,

103) .

Having too tn any

allego ri es to choose from feels a lot li ke havin g nebul ous qu es ti ons.
Cowlin g ~dso addu ces sources, or al leas t important pr 'cedents, for La vie: Pi casso's
own T, vo Sist. ers and Til e [;'111brace, Co urbet's Pai nt a's Studio: A /~ail Allego,·y Co mprisi11g

Sev~ n Y~ars of My Arti stir Life(1 855 ), Gaugu in's Where Do We Co n1 e Fro111 ? What Are We?
Wha~ Ar~ We Goi11g? (secondin g Ri chard son's sugg stion) , and Pi erre Pu vis <l e Chava nn 's's Poo r Fis/1 ama11 (Cow li ng,

10 1- 2, 10 4). (M aril y11 McCull y acids El Greco's Joh11
th e Baptist. and Slli,1t Fm11 cis.' Ge rco11 Bcc ht-Jorde11 s suggests that th e Casagetna s fi gu re's

,n,,

hand ges ture is lif'lc<l from th e ico nograp hy of'th c Noli
tcrngae.6)
Like Richardson's revelations, Cowli11 g's co ntributions to our k11owlcdg ' (and specu lati ons) about L(l vi,; arc plau sibl e, th oughtfi.il , a11d produc tive If' I proceed in a different
direc ti o11, I do so to supp lc111cnt th e work of thcs 'w ri ters (a11<l ofoth crs), not to counter it.
And if I leave us 110 surer of the topi c of' Pi casso's a ll cgory, I do 1101 sec that as fa il ure, either.
Robin so n, in hi s study of L(l vi<', co nsid ers the cl evclopm c11t of th e paintin g i11 its
va ri ous co11tcx ts and s tat

' S,

givin g what is probabl y the full es t available accoun t of its

J I< l HOUur r101,

development. He even adds to the painting's iconography the mysterious Birdrnan,
which appears as a figure mostly painted out on one of the pictures between the two
groups. Again, like Richardson and Cowling and McCully and Theodore Reff: Robinson
clarifies our understanding of the painting without-however strange it may seernproposing a clear meaning. Indeed, he suggests that Picasso deliberately withheld the
resolution we all seem to be looking for (Robinson, Picasso and tile Mystaies of Lij~. r37).
I could not agree more. But I want to understand the reason.
Perhaps Picasso is practicing a strategy of evasion-deliberately refusing a kind of
intelligibility to protect himself and his work from subjection to literature and literary
notions of meaning. Some of the best work in understanding symbolist pictorial art's
reaction to its entanglements with literary production shows the importance of such a
refusal.7 Although this interpretation makes sense, it would lead (at least in this strippeddown form) to an impoverished view of La vie and other early works of Picasso's unless
we can also offer a positive account of its relation to meaning, that is to say, unless the
interpretation also included an account of what the painting does, rather than exclusively
one of what it refuses to do. 8
Rosalind Krauss makes such a proposal in response to the iconographic approaches
I have been discussing. She is more critical of certain aspects of those approaches than
I have been, and her objections deserve full attention. Writing from the "threshold of a
postmodernist art," to whose "proto-history" she considers Picasso's collage to have
belonged, Krauss sees in the proliferation of referential readings like those I have been
discussing a rearguard action against "the play of meaning," against ·•form," and again 5t
"polysemy." 9 Precise referential readings, which she refers to as expressions of an "'aesthetics of the proper name," fix meaning and exhaust reading (or beholding):
Unlike allegory, in which a linked and burgeoning series of names establishes an open-rnded
set of analogies-Jonah/Lazarus/Christ-there is in this aesthetics of the proper narne a
contraction of sense to the simple task of pointing, or labeling, to the act of unequivocal
reference. It is as though the shifting, changing sands of visual polyserny, of multiple meanings and regroupings, have made us intolerably nervous, so that we wish to find the bedrock
of sense. We wish to achieve a type of signification beyond which there can be no further
reading or interpretation. Interpretation, we insist, must be made to stop sornewhere.
(Krauss, "'111 the N;1me of Picasso," .c8)

Krauss locates the origin of this "aesthetics of the proper name" in the field of" latter-day
Picasso studies, in Pierre Daix's r9G7 identification of Carles Casagernas as the rnale
figure at the left in La vie. 10
[O]ncc a real person could be placed as the model for the standing male figure-11101-e<>ver
a person whose life involved the lurid details of impotence and failed horn icide but acltit'Ved
suicide-the earlier interpretations of La Vie as an allegory of maturation and development
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could be put aside for a more local and specific meaning. Henceforth the picture could be
seen as a tableau vivcmt containing the dead man torn between two women, one old and
one young, the meaning of which "is" sexual dread. And because early studies for the
painting show that the male figure had originally been conceived as Picasso's self-portrait,
one could now hypothesize the artist's identification with his friend and read the work as
"expressing ... that sense of himself as having been thrust by women into an untenable
and ultimately tragic position ...."11

Krauss's argument is provocative, and I have some responses to make. As I have noted,
the open, allegorical readings of La vie did not stop with Daix and Reff (whom Krauss
quotes at the end of the extract above). Interest in referential readings did not shut down
allegorical readings of La vie. Perhaps that is the salutary effect ofKrauss's essay. Or perhaps
we might ask Krauss why the reading Reff proposes docs not count as an allegory-after
all, on that reading, Picasso would be using the enigmatic scene, the two women, and even
his own dead friend's likeness to allegorize the sadness of tragic love. Instead of "Jonah/
Lazarus/Christ," we would have "Casagcrnas/Picasso/the suffering lover." 12
As Krauss points out in a footnote, though, her concern about using proper narnes in the
painting's interpretation is not that it "merely adds another dimension to the interpretation
of a given work" (Krauss, "In the Name of Picasso," 2911.14), but that it restricts us from
meanings that transcend (my word) the local circumstances the proper names denote. This
is why Krauss argues that in the hands of more traditional, biographical, critics, La vie loses
its obvious place in the tradition of studio paintings and ends up being about the seamy
details of Casagcrnas's end: "[T]hc work echoes such distinguished nineteenth-century forebears as Courbet and Manet in insisting that, for a painter, life and art allcgorize each other,
both caught up equally in the problem of representation. The name Casagemas docs not
extend far enough to signify either this relationship or this problem" (Krauss, 29).
E3ut would Krauss want to say that we arc better off not knowing that the figure on the
left is based on the appearance of Casagcmas? Of course not. Perhaps she wants us to
remember to combine our referential readings with allegorical ones. If that is the case,
then we might say that the problem with the "aesthetic of the proper name" is that it
tempts us to let historical research stop paintings from addressing themselves to us who
live outside the context of production from which they arose. Indeed, because signs
structurally incorporate the absence of the referent, it is not just the contingent fact of
our historical distance from l'icasso and Casagemas that makes reading signs necessarily depend on overcoming the aesthetic of the proper name. For Krauss, Picasso and
Casagclllas remain absent from the painting as long as we continue to read it as a sign.
When we see the painting strictly in relation to historical persons, when we reduce it to
its historical referents, we have stopped reading it as a sign. "The aesthetics of the proper
name is erected specifically 011 the grave offorlll" (Krauss, "In the Nallie of Picasso," 39).
The corrective Krauss finds built into l'icasso's own career is cubist collage, which she
calls a "lllctalanguage of the visual" (Krauss, "I II the Nallie of Picasso," 37). 1t insists
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those structural features of signs that we ought to bear in mind generally. That is to say,
collage empties out reference and voids even biographical associations that cling to th e
author in favor of signs (understood as '" differences without any positive terms'"),

13

so that

"the impersonal operations oflanguage ... are the subject of collage" (Krauss, 39; emphasis in original). By referring to the "impersonal operations of language," Krauss means
that "from the point of view of structure, a speaker does not so much speak, as he is
spoken by, language. The linguistic structure of signs 'speaks' Picasso's collages • · · "
(39). That the sign speaks for itself, out of its structure, in the beholder's encounter wi th
it-not from within the context of its production (which includes its historical referents
and historical author)-Krauss takes to be a structural fact about signs. Collage is special
only in the way it forces the issue, in the fact that it is about this fact. Hence Picasso's
proto-postmodernism. And hence the incompatibility of an "'aesthetics of the proper
name" with Krauss's notion of the sign. The conflict is about shifting the locus of mean·
ing-production from the author to the reader, or from the painter to the beholder, not
about the propensity of a scholar with a positive identification to forget form.
But would that proto-postmodernism really be Picasso's? No. That is not what Krauss
says. The postmodernism is all ours, as it were, insofar as it is a decision about how to
interpret signs. Although Krauss would not put it that way either, it is where the logic of
her position arguably leads. I say so because, in speaking of signs as part of a •'lingui st ic
structure," which "'speaks,"' Krauss's argument makes explicit what Steven Knapp and
Walter Benn Michaels would call its theoretical nature. By placing the locus of interpretive
authority in language (rather than in the historical intentions of an author), Krauss's argu·
ment becomes theoretical, in their sense of the term. Once an account of interpretation
distinguishes authorial intention from meaning, they explain, it becomes "'theoretical."
Further, as they argue, one inevitable-even if unwanted-consequence of a "'theoretical"
position is a radical polysemy (i.e., in principle, anything could [be taken to] mean any·
thing). 14 To put the question succinctly, if authorial intention is not the object of interpretation, what is? Knapp and Michaels have argued that nothing could be. So if Picasso really
meant his collage to thematize the supposed "origin less play of the signifier," then he is a
(proto-)postmodernist; on a poststructuralist account (such as I take Krauss's to be, or at
least to entail), however, his collages participate in, even epitomize, that free play, not
because of his intentions for them, but because they are signs, just like La vit: or any other
picture.
So we agree that La vie is an allegory. As such, it assumes the burden of speaking to
us, of embodying in visible form a call of some kind. It must exist to cornpel us. And we
have two different proposals: that we seek out the determinate references of the figures
and other elements of the picture and try to reconstruct Picasso's intentions, or that we
let the painting drift away from its origins and enter fully into the free play of the signifier. Which proposal you accept-whether you feel compelled to understand the picture
according to Picasso's historical situation or want to treat it as marks cut off from their
authorial origin-depends on where you stand methodologically.
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Either way, however, you face a problem in responding to La vie. The painting in the
first proposal is filled with objectively determined references to people, pictorial types,
older paintings, biblical personages, tarot cards, and much more. But despite the efforts
of our best researchers, some or most of those references always remain private, beyond
our reach. Our responses to the painting, even after considerable research, remain those
of outsiders. Even worse, this limitation has to do, not just with our research, but also
with our relation to history itsel( For instance, I accept without reservation that the male
figure on the left is a picture of Casagemas, and I dimly imagine what a grave and painful image that must have offered Picasso. But Picasso is gone, along with everyone else
who knew Casagemas, and despite the apparent callousness in saying so, I have to admit
that Casagemas the historical person means nothing to me. If we concede that the painting depends on its reference to Casagemas, then we may find ourselves narrowly limited
in our effort to respond to the picture-to bring to it or to allow it to compel from us the
quality of feeling appropriate to it.
Even if we recognize that the male figure on the left is a picture of Casagemas, we may
nevertheless empty out its referential function in order to put it into play as a signifier.
Then the historical remoteness of Casagemas ceases to be a problem for us, but the
reference to him (whatever meanings we agree to project onto the work) also ceases to
guide us. Nor does any other resemblance, identification, or reference we can propose
necessarily have purchase on our experience of the painting. Your response to the painting is your own, no matter how insightfol or arbitrary. You may develop highly eccentric
ideas about the picture, yet I cannot say that you have failed to respond to it. I can only
complain that you have ceased to respond to the painting before which we stand and have
begun to respond, if that is the right word, to your own eccentric invention. In short,
either way we go methodologically, we appear to be blocked from responding to this
allegory built around the figure of Casagernas. 15
Perhaps this dilemma seems a little artificial. After all, we do respond to works of art,
even very old ones, and there is something coherent about our responses to them. That
is perfectly true, but it is also important that our methodological positions seem to leave
no room for works of art to compel meaningful responses from us. That is to say, our
methodological reflections are hollow unless they can be part of our reflection on the way
works do or do not have authority for us.
I provide an alternative approach to this and other works of Picasso's Blue and Rose
periods that centers on formal features of the works that are remarked less frequently or
never. In their light, these pictures-including Lei vie-make more sense, even if that
approach does not explain why a woman with a baby (rather than a bearded man with a
palette) stands on the composition's right-hand side.
What I mean by authority is fundamentally the ability to compel (action, belief emotion,
and so forth). I mean this precisely in opposition to the ability to coerce. I am interested in
authority, not authoritarianism, which is more like a failure of authority than an expression
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--·-----~----of it. The chapters that follow provide more than one opportunity to see the difference. 1
have no particular source (other than its ordinary usage) in mind for this use of the term

authority. The term has roots in ancient Rome, where it had, as it docs for us, a broad use.
"Auctoritas was to be found in public and in private life," E. D. Watt explains: "It was
ascribed to founders, parents, tutors, patrons and givers of advice, to wise men and to
ancestors." 16 Under the Republic, for example, each civil official "had the potestas or th e

imperium, limited in time and in scope, that went with his office. Within these specified
limits, his commands were legally binding" (Watt, 12). A civil official also had auctoritas,
although he could not legally on that basis require compliance. The Roman Senate, by
contrast, had only auctoritas. Senatorial power lay in it and in it alone. Watt, following
Theodor Mommsen, describes this civic or legal sense of auctoritas as "something more
than advice (Ratschlag) and less than command ( Befdil), as the kind of counsel which could
not properly be shunned" (12). When one looks at a painting like La vie, one has the feeling
of being offered food for reflection. The lesson's seriousness derives from the painter's
perspective as witness, but our response joins a faith in that act of witness with a certain
resource of our own-a moral or personal seriousness that allows us to be cornpcllcd or
moved or affected by the painter's visual testimony. The painter claims the authority of
one with something compelling to reveal who is in a position to reveal it. A beholder's task
is to rise to the occasion the painter produces.
Paintings, however, do not work by piling up evidence for the point of view they express.
Similarly, if authority cannot be reduced to coercion, neither is it exactly argument. Hannah
Arendt explains: "Since authority always demands obedience, it is commonly mistaken for
some form of power or violence. Yet authority precludes the use of external means of cocr•
cion; where force is used, authority has failed. Authority, on the other hand, is incompatible
with persuasion, which presupposes equality and works through a process of argumcnta•
tion. Where arguments are used, authority is left in abeyancc." 17 In its original Roman
sense, she continues, authority was connected to founding. (This is also a sense Watt mentions.) "Those endowed with authority were the ciders, the Senate or the pat res, who had
obtained it by descent and by transmission (tradition) from those who had laid the foundations for all things to come, the ancestors, whom the Romans therefore called the 11wiord'
(Arendt, 121-22). When that tradition ended, that is, when the succession that connected
Rome to its founders was broken, its "political and spiritual heritage passed to the Chri st ian
Church," "the death and resurrection of Christ" became the new foundation, and with that
shift the community of believers became a religion (125). The Church's authority was then
based on and preserved and transmitted in a distinctly Roman way (125-26). The Church,
however, amalgamated this Roman authority with Greek Platonic philosophy based on
"transcending measurements and rules" (127)-in short, 011 reason. But this delicate amalgamation depended on the stability of the trio of Roman inheritances:
Wherever one of the clements of the Roman trinity, religion or authority or tradition. was
doubted or eliminated, the remaining two were no longer secure. Thus, it was l.uthl'r's
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error to think that his challenge of the temporal authority of the Church and his appeal to
unguided individual judgment would leave tradition and religion intact. So it was the error
of Hobbes and the political theorists of the seven tee 11th century to hope that authority and
religion could be saved without tradition. So, too, was it finally the error of the humanists
to think it would be possible to remain within an unbroken tradition of Western civilization
without religion and without authority.
(128)

So what does authority look like in the aftermath of these "errors"? What has become of
authority in the modern age?
For her answer, Arendt turns to Machiavelli and Robespierre, who saw that authority
depended 011 founding and understood that a modern act of founding could serve the
purpose. f-urther, and as Marx pointed out apropos the French Revolution, these revolutionary acts of fcnmding have "appeared on the stage of history in Roman costume"
(Arendt, 139). That is to say, they are simultaneously modern and inaugural events and
"attempts to repair these foundations, to renew the broken thread of tradition" (140).
This is not the place to discuss the character and historical trappings of modern revolutions. Our topic is the relation of the young Picasso and some ofhis contemporaries to
the problems of symbolist art and poetry. My argument is that they, like Arendt's revolutionaries, experienced modernity as a challenge to reflect on a lost or forgotten relation
to authority and that that task entails considering the modern subject's place in history
and the relevance of historical truth to our moral considerations in the present. This
means considering the modern loss of the pillars of Roman authority and the crisis that
loss precipitated.
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MODERNISMS AND AUTHORITIES

After a short introit framing his theme, Clement Greenberg begins rolling out the historical logic of modernism with what sounds like a general reference to life under modernity: "A society, as it becomes less and less able, in the course of its development, to
justify the inevitability of its particular forms, breaks up the accepted notions upon which
artists and writers must depend in large part for conm1tmication with their audiences. It
becomes diflicult to assume anything. All the verities involved by religion, authority,
tradition, style, arc thrown into question, and the writer or artist is no longer able to
estimate the response of his audience to the symbols and references with which he
works." 1
Despite my general reservations about Greenberg's account of modernism (both the
theoretical and the historical sides of it), I cite it to show how deeply embedded in it is
the notion that modernism means losing touch with "the verities involved by religion
[and] authority." To put it plainly, in what follows, I argue that he is more or less right
about that, even if I might put the matter in a more nuanced way. 2 Let's say he is recognizing modern art's perspective
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the problems Arendt described.

As a more nuanced account of modernism, consider a similar passage from Stanley
Cavel!, explaining how and why, under modernity, "the writing of philosophy is dij]irnlt
in a new way" (emphasis in the original).

It is the diflirnlty modern philosophy shares with the modern arts (and, for that matter,
with modern tht•ology: and, for all I know, with modern physics), a diflirnlty broached, or

reflected, in the nineteenth-century's radical breaking of tradition within the several arts;
a moment epitomized in Marx's remark that "... the criticism of religion is in the main
complete ... " (Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Introduction)• This
is the beginning of what I have called the modern, characterizing it as a moment in which
history and its conventions can no longer be taken for granted; the time in which music
and painting and poetry (like nations) have to define themselves against their pasts; the
beginning of the moment in which each of the arts becomes its own subject, as if its immediate artistic task is to establish its own existence. The new difficulty which comes to light
in the modernist situation is that of maintaining one's belief in one's own enterprise, for
the past and the present become problematic together. I believe that philosophy shares the
modernist difficulty now everywhere evident in the major arts, the difficulty of making
one's present effort become a part of the present history of the enterprise to which one has
committed one's mind, such as it is. 1
More clearly and fully than Greenberg, Cavell sounds the themes I noted first in
Arendt. The moderns must refound their relationship with their enterprises, with their
institutions, even with their knowledge or lose the authority to speak for and to one
another. This is what I take Cavell to mean in saying, farther along: "When, in what follows, I feel pressed by the question of my right to speak for philosophy, I sometimes
suggest that I am merely speaking for myself, and sometimes I suggest that philosophy
is not mine at all-its results are true for every man or else they are worthless" (Cavell,
xxv-xxvi). This is a way of expressing the difficulty of arriving at conclusions on one's
own-that is to say, without recourse to any external authority, "merely speaking for

myseif'-that can be meaningful (even for oneself) only if they are true for everyone. One
must be independent of external authority in one's reasoning, and then independent
again, in a different way, to be able to assert that the truth of one's conclusions does not
depend on one's particular position. Cavell's way of talking about his difficulty is, then,
also a way of expressing the difficulty of speaking philosophically at all. As if to respond
to this concern, or to reframe it, Cavell considers popularizers of philosophy-or, more
precisely, those who believe in popularizing philosophy: "I think someone who believes
in popular, or in popularizing, philosophy [ ... ] believes that the ordinary man stands in
relation to serious philosophy as, say, the ordinary believer stands in relation to serious
theology-that he cannot understand it in its own terms but that it is nevertheless good
for him to know its results, in some form or other" (xxvii).
Popularizing philosophy does what Cavell can't do-it reconciles easily the desire to
speak for oneself with the need to speak only if what one says can count for everyone.
This popularizing that just conveys authoritative findings to the layman, Cavell says, is
"the late version of one of philosophy's most ancient betrayals-the effort to use philosophy's name to put a front on beliefs rather than to face the source of assumption, or of
emptiness, which actually maintains them" (Cavell, xxvii-xxviii). The popularizers' solution to the problem is a betrayal because it does not let the (popular) audience be independent too. It requires that readers of such work take what it says on authority and
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accept that they are in no position to reestablish its truth independently for themselves.
This may be okay or necessary, as Cavel! sees it, for theology but it is not, for philosophy.
In this Cavel! brushes against some trouble in modernist theology (perhaps without having it exactly in mind).
What Cavel! calls the "question of philosophy's audience" (Cavel!, xxviii) is the heart
of his account of philosophy's modernism, but it is also as old as his own philosophical
tradition-as old as Socrates's learning from the Oracle that no man was wiser than he,
and thus knowing that he <lid not know. Cavel! takes that discovery to be "the discovery
of philosophy, when it is the effort to find answers, and permit questions, which nobody
knows the way to nor the answer to any better than you yourself" (xxviii).
When Socrates learned that the Oracle had said 110 man is wiser than Socrates, he interpreted this to mean, we are told, that he knew that he did not know. And we are likely to
take this as a bit of faded irony or as a stuffy humility. What I take Socrates to have seen is
that, about the questions which were causing him wonder and hope and confusion and
pain, he knew that he did not know what no man can know, and that any man could learn
what he wanted to learn. No man is in any better position for knowing it than any other
man-unless wanting to know is a special position. And this discovery about himself is the
same as the discovery of philosophy, when it is the effort to find answers, and permit questions, which nobody knows the way to nor the answer to any better than you yourself
(Cavell, xxviii)

In other words, Cave II secs modernism's problem in philosophy's origin, and his response
to the challenge of philosophizing in the modern moment is to take up, to reappropriate,
philosophy's original challenge: having no access to external or higher authority, we are
all given the task of finding the authority to speak for ourselves and to one another. 4 This
is also the heart of modernity's discomfort with revealed religion and the reason modernism rejects dogma: revelation and dogma arc claims someone (a theologian, a prophet,
the Church) makes: to know the truth better than you or to have been in a better position
than you to know the truth. One may respond that one's theology has squared its claims
with modernism's objections, that it has rcframed the authority of scripture so as to make
it responsive or accountable to anyone's personal experience-to permit you that independence. Maybe that's as much as to say that theology (some ofit-tlwt theology, anyway) has
submitted itself to modernism's challenge, or that that theology has become philosophy.
Robert Pippin has also represented modernity and modernism in philosophical
terms-not because they arc philosophical first and last in their character, but because,
like Greenberg and Cavcll, he secs them as expressions of a relation between modern
people and the way they understand themselves, the world, and their place in it. "Modern
institutions," as Pippin puts it, meaning "literary, religious, moral, educational, and aesthetic as well as scientific" institutions, "presume a distinct sort of authority, a claim to
allegiance based 011 distinct premises that are essentially philosophical claims and do not

M O D ER

t,

I SM S A

t,

IJ

,\ U T H O R I T I E S

17

remain unaffected by skeptical attacks, however complicated and abstract the academic
form of those attacks can initially be." 5
Modern philosophy's aim, its response to the "skeptical attacks" it launches against
everything within reach, its "ideal," is a "classical philosophical ideal: the possibility that
human beings can regulate and evaluate their beliefs by rational self.reflection, that they
can free themselves from interest, passion, tradition, prejudice and autonomously 'rule'
their own thoughts, and that they can determine their actions as a result of sclf:rcflection
and rational evaluation" (Pippin, r2). Here Pippin's account parallels Cavell's diagnosis
of modern philosophy's recourse to what individuals can establish for themselves. The
history of philosophy and critical theory since Kant has called into question central clements of this classical ideal-and even its feasibility and desirability in general. Indeed,
that history-the history of that calling-into-question-is the topic of Pippin's study.
Nevertheless, in the end, he is able to affirm that, no matter how skeptical we arc of our
claims to "independent self.reflection," our skeptical questioning is always a claim to "a
renewed form of independence," even if it can no longer seek "reassurance in self:
certainty or foundations, and provokes again the groundless search for reconciliations
with other self-conscious agents unavoidable in modernity" (178).
If criticisms of modernism's project are attempts to discover its blind spots, they can
always also be counted as attempts to advance its project, its skeptical attack, which aims
to relieve us of what we can no longer believe in and replace it with what we can believe
in, independently and critically, on our own authority. In other words, when we talk of
modernism, we should not speak of it as something we can have surpassed. Rather than
do that, Pippin outlines a frame of mind that seems inescapable by this time, to which
skepticism holds beliefs rigorously accountable, and in which our attempts at justification have to be both personal (based on nothing but what we can know, not dependent
on external authority) and generalizable (they mustn't be dependent
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our personal

"interest, passion, tradition, preju<lice").r'
When Pippin speaks of"skeptical attacks," and specifically "more and more ambitious
claims for the supreme authority of reason in human affairs, contra the claims of tradition, the ancestors, and, especially, the Church [ ... ]" (Pippin, 4), I take him to mean, as
I took Cavell to mean, that one must speak, if one will speak with authority, in the light
of some justification that responds to skepticism-a justification that, like Ca veil's philosophical speech and unlike that of his philosophical popularizers, takes on the problem
of establishing at first hand and of making public or else abandoning the ground on
which one makes one's claims. I take him to mean, further, that those claims hold independent of the contingent, particular, personal position from which they arc made.
No wonder, then, that modernism excludes the Roman Catholic Church •'especially."
Its deposit of faith, its claim to truth, is founded not on its availability to everyone, but
on precisely the opposite, on the claim that it was transmitted in the Catholic Church's
teaching (that it was a "form of sound words" [2 Timothy 1:13]) and that Jesus Christ
would ensure (in some way that promises nothing to <lo with responsiveness to skeptical
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challenges) that the Church would not err subsequently in its doctrine ("And behold I am
with you all days, even to the consumrnation of the world." [Matthew 28:20]). This is
the gesture of founding at the core of the Church's authority, as Arendt describes it. The
Catholic Church is on the outs with modernism, not simply because it is more vulnerable
to skeptical attacks than a lot of other institutions; it is dependent on principle, in the
sense Pippin has in mind, so that it cannot attempt a methodological re-grounding as
modern philosophy has (or, at very least. it can't try it in the same ways).
Tlrns, the Catholic Church's position in modernity is not just the result of a rearguard
mentality or of conservative leadership, as is sometimes said. The Catholic Church has a
distinctive and inalienable claim to its special and avowed place in the list of levees that
failed so that modernism could sweep across our intellectual landscape. If nothing else, I
hope I have at least already drawn attention to what I see as an uncontroversial claim: that
attacking or rejecting the Church's authority is a standard, though sometimes implicit,
feature of accounts of the origin of modernism. (Often, revealed religion more generally
can take the Church's place; nevertheless, for reasons we'll see soon, the Roman Catholic
Church remains the essential example.) To add to that claim, I suggest also that the rejection of the Church in these accounts is not incidental, but structural, part of their logic. I
say "suggest," rather than "claim" or "insist," because I don't not aim to prove it, or at least
to let proving it be my burden. I3ut that's not the last I have to say 011 the subject, either.
What Greenberg, Cavell, Marx, and Pippin (and others) say together is that the modern
world had its faith in religious dogma shaken vigorously (" ... the criticism of religion is
in the main complete ... "). I3ut Cavell, at least, by referring to the continued existence
of serious theology, acknowledges that although the criticism of religion may be complete
and theology (or the Catholic Church) stands-for those who want to give an accounting
of the modern world or of modernism-as the paradigm of what can no longer ground
our beliefs and our actions, theology did not end with modernism. In what follows, it is
not my brief to continue sketching a picture of modernism in general that traces its relation to skeptical attacks on dogmatic authority. From here, I begin to narrow the scope
of my project to close in on one nwmrnt in that history, and
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two projects that show,

in extraordinary vividness, modernism's struggle with authority: Picasso's paintings of
the so-called Blue and Rose periods (roughly, 1902 to 1905) and Apollinaire's short stories
from L'l1cn!sian111c t'.! Cic (1910). In the rest of this chapter, I take specific historical examples and arguments to define the problem of authority in the later nineteenth century
and explain how it relates to the task of writing. Ultimately, I turn to the work of Charles
Baudelaire and Apollinaire for examples of poems that assert authority over the reader.

THEOCRATIC AND THEOLOGICAL

To focus on the problem of authority in approximately the moment that concerns us, I
turn briefly to two examples drawn from the fin de sil'cle. They demonstrate individually
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the problem of authority as it stood at the turn of the twentieth century; between them,
they also show what I call the thematic face of authority: the need for appeals to authority
to define themselves in relation to or against other kinds of appeals (judicial and "physiocratic" against theocratic; historical against divine).
In October 1899 Julien Benda (who later earned some fame for his La traliison

des clercs [1927]) published an essay on the Dreyfus Affair.7 In "L'Affaire Dreyfus et le
Principe d'autorite" (The Dreyfus Affair and the principle of authority), Benda describes
the Dreyfus Affair as a showdown between two "antagonistic elements," "social forces"
and "individual forces," which, in their ongoing conflict, "constitute the history of
humanity" (Benda, 190). The individual forces tend toward minimal social organization,
represented at a certain extreme by the notion of anarchy; meanwhile, the social forces
drive toward the "hierarchical pole" (Benda, 190). Benda explains the relevance of this
scheme to understanding the Dreyfus Affair. He begins by considering the government's
actions of 1894 and 1895, from Dreyfus's arrest through his punishment:
What is the character of all these acts? Absolutism: the certitude of being inspired by the
truth; the image they spontaneously evoke is that of the sword of God lowering itself here,
uncontrolled, terrible, infallible, and irremediable. Having recognized that, one may affirm
that from the day ofhis demotion and when everyone believed in the guilt of the condemned
man, a divorce had already accomplished itselfamong men: some applauding the theocratic
character of the sanction; others finding that man, however well established his conviction
might be, never has the right to declare it in such an affirmative manner and unconsciously,
out ofhatred ofhuman pride, already conferring some vague sympathy on the condemned
man. 8

Benda's point is less about the Dreyfus Affair than about authority. Benda, in effect,
turns the two sides of the conflict over Dreyfus into opposing stances toward a particular
kind of authority-that is, toward the right or the ability of those in positions of power
to declare the truth and to act on it. There are those who support (perhaps rdisli
would be a more apt term) "theocratic" authority, which is to say, a total authorityauthority founded on a readiness to do violence such as Arendt attributed to modern
attempts to found (such as Machiavelli's and Robespierre's) and on the pretense of certitude, without that limitation that takes the form of doubt (a sensitivity to the skeptical
attacks of which Pippin writes)-and there are those who sympathize with Dreyfus
before ever learning any mitigating or exculpatory information, precisely because they
do not accept authority based on bald assertion of power or on certainty. Benda, one may
already suppose, feels some reservations about this hierarchical, "theocratic," authority.
In fact, they are reservations that Cavell and Pippin noted: "theocratic" authority is just
what modernism refuses to tolerate on their accounts-one might say that,
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accounts, modernism just is the refusal of authority. But the matter is not so simple.
Benda continues:
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Herc, it is appropriate to dispel a misunderstanding. Many people believe that one of the
essential attributes of the modern mind, one of those by which it most clearly opposes itself
to the primitive mind, is the repudiation of all authority. That is false: the least disciplined
man knows quite well that in taking a cup of tea to assuage a migraine, in avoiding iced
drinks when he is perspiring, or in using with confidence his table of logarithms, he is
implicitly obeying an authority; he knows quite well that if the beliefs that determine his
actions were each subjected to full determination by reason, without the cooperation of
authority, he would not live twenty-four hours. So in recognizing subjectively the existence
and the necessity ofan authority, [there is] no schism between the modern mind and the
old. Where is the schism? In the objective value they recognize, the one and the other, in
that authority, the old mind according to authority a superhuman essence, a definitive
character, and admitting that it manifests itself by irrevocable acts, the modern mind
according to it by contrast a completely human essence, a necessarily fragile and transitory
character, and demanding that it show itself by acts that are always rcvocable. 9

Everyone depends on authority. One lives one's life by performing thousands oflittle
acts of faith in various authorities (the authority of home remedies, of conventional wisdom, of publishers of reference works). The modern challenge to authority isn't a refusal
of authority per se; rather, it's a matter of qualifying all authority because of the fallible
and relative quality of human knowing. Hence the importance of I3enda's use of the term

tlieocratic to denote the kind of authority that underwrote the initial phases of the Dreyfus
Affair; he was not claiming that the army had a revelation of divine truth, or even that the
military asserted anything of the sort, but that it mimicked in its pretensions to certitude
the kind of authority in its decisions that the Church asserts. It is a kind of modern
refounding, in the manner of Arendt's Robespierre. The other kind of authority, which
the modern mind finds more congenial and which calls only on human ways of knowing,
is not "theocratic," but it is also never certain.
I3enda sees advantages in the "theocratic" character of the army's authority. In fact, if
he were inclined to defend the army's position, he says, he "would have begun by declaring that 'probably Dreyfus was innocent,' a declaration that would vitiate immediately
any victorious effort by my adversaries on the question of fact; then, audaciously transforming the Affair into a pure moral question, I'd have said: 'The army living on nothing
but the health of its authority, and the army being more indispensable to us than ever,
the greater interest demands the upholding of the sentence."'
"moderates," on the other hand, who want to reform the army.

10

He heaps scorn on the
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Rather than either support "theocratic" authority for the military or advocate the suppression of the army, though, I3cnda looks forward to a modern turning away from "theocratic" or militaristic authority that will transform the army, and transform war with it.
One day, the common fighting man will sec through the illusions the powerful have used
to turn him into an obedient soldicr-"fcar," "notions of fatherland, of national heritage,
of Latin race, of the Germanic world, etc. ..." After the common soldier sees through
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these leftovers of"feudal tyranny," "he will no longer throw himself into war except at the
point of immediate need." From that time on, the army will respond, not to "discipline,"
but to "personal interest" (Benda, 205). "The theocratic army will have given way to the
physiocratic army" ("L'armee theocratique aura fait place al'armee physiocratique"; 205).
Benda then warns us, who overcome old "theocratic" ideas with our modern critical
minds, against imagining ourselves superior and triumphant. Afier all, by assuring "the
brutal victory of the fitter races over the less fit, the theocratic ideal [ ... ] contributed
powerfully to the happiness of the species." That is because when earlier man, "by reason
of the grossness of his sensibility and the tyrannizing difficulties of material life, could
not absorb the altruistic principles necessary to the preservation of human associations
other than by submission to a super-worldly [supra-terrestre] command, the theocratic
ideal was a true agent of social benefit" (Benda, 206). Benda doesn't specify which victories or what moment in history or prehistory he has in mind, but presumably he means
that those human ancestors who could bracket their individual concerns well enough to
unite against rivals advanced the cause of humanity generally, and further that because
they were unable to anticipate the benefit of collective action, they managed it only by
shared submission to the authority of otherworldly, "theocratic," ideals. So, false as those
ideals may have been, they at least served the well-being of mankind, or of 011r mankind.
(Presumably, we are the winners' heirs.)
Now that we no longer need this tyrannical authority to clarify our interests for us,
however, we're better off But we should not suppose that we have reached the end of our
education: "a crisis, no matter how beneficial it may be, docs not mark a radical substitution of the reign of truth for that of error, but simply the supplanting of an erroneous
doctrine by a less erroneous doctrine." 12 Someday we'll seem like barbarians, too.
But the process itself is justified. If we moderns have lost our belief in the old ideals,
we have gained a new belief in reason and its ability to replace those outworn ideals with
ever truer notions. So we should feel "profound humility as to our individual powers,
combined with a certain naive pride stemming from our awareness that we belong to a
species that advances toward perfection and knows that it is headed thcre." 11
Benda's scheme describes an ongoing exchange between the forces of" !llatcrial necessity and self-interest (which we might call "physiocratic" authority), on one hand, and the
collective or supernatural imperatives of God and country (his "theocratic" authority),
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the other. Early in his essay, he represents this exchange as a tension between hierarchical forms of social organization and anarchy, but he quickly removes the discussion to
the realm of justification, of authority. Talk of social hierarchies and of arurchislll never
really returns. Benda's account of authority (including migraine re!lledies and logarithms) does not really have much to do with government, either; it is an account ofhmv
beliefs underwrite our actions, not of how we respond to people of superior rank. The
most intriguing aspect of Benda's essay, to my eye and in relation to rny focus, is that he
opposes the unmodern "theocratic" notion ofautlrority to self interest. which is to say, to
the practical exigencies oflife in general and to the pursuit of material advantage. I II fact,
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to the extent he finds it possible, he empties out all authority and replaces it with practical considerations. Right as he is that we moderns submit to certain forms of authority
(accepting some of what we know on authority, for example), he also shows forcefully
and sometimes in spite ofhimsclf how inimical submission to authority is to the modern
mind. Indeed, he demonstrates it by redirecting his topic at every turn away from the
matter of religious doctrine that lends his discussion of authority its paradigm. This is a
crucial problem with Benda's thinking, but one that makes his argument all the more
relevant for our purposes.
Pablo Picasso and the other figures I discuss came of age in the modern world, which
is to say, more or less, in Benda's world. Barcelona was no haven from the problems
Benda described, and we know that Picasso's ambit-from his youth through the cubist
period and beyond-was filled with people who wrestled with problems of authority and
power, anarchism and order. As we know, Picasso concerned himself with those issues
to some extent. 11 Apollinaire was even more explicitly engaged. 1, My aim in what follows
is not to add to that discussion, not directly anyway, by supporting or rebutting claims
about Picasso's engagement with anarchism or about the nature of his putative anarchism. My purpose is to discuss the way he addresses the problem of authority in his
work from about

1902

to about

1905.

In so doing, I make a claim about his relation to

the problems of modernism-specifically, its concern with authority.
Here we can see the relation-or one face of it, which we might call the methodological face-of Picasso's early work to the problem of authority. In calling one face of the
problem of authority "methodological," I refer to the need for an authority to establish its
claim to a truth. We generally refer to people as authorities because they can be relied on
to know the truth (about their areas of expertise). The Church's authority rests on its
assertions about the truth of its doctrine. The authority of our arguments about a work
of art depends on the soundness of our methods. Our brieflook at La vi~ led to two ways
of understanding the picture. One gathers enough arcane historical data to decode iconographic references to produce an allegorical reading we can proclaim to our public, as
popularizers of philosophy proclaim the results of philosophy. The modern mind finds
this kind of authority suspect-external, dependent, theocratic. (Roland Barthes's "Death
of the Author" is the locus classicus for the equation of[the critic's] interest in the author
with a theocratic authoritarianism.) I<, The other way of understanding appeals to our
personal experiences, to our encounter with the picture itself: But if those experiences
arc merely subjective-if my response holds only for me-then I have failed to find a way
to speak for everyone (as Cavcll might put it), to overcome my dependence on my own
position (as Pippin might say), or to avoid emptying authority out altogether (as we saw
Benda do, in effect). Picasso sought to embody in and to project for the beholder a modern relation to authority in his paintings. Hence his engagement with religion. It is far
from coincidental that just at the moment Picasso was devising his enigmatic allegories
and plays on traditional iconography, Christianity was simultaneously at a critical stage
in its own engagement with modernism.
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All the writers I have mentioned so far (Marx, Benda, Greenberg, Cavell, Pippin, and
others) have connected the problem of authority (whether they used that term or not)
with religion. As I have said, there are good, one might say structural, reasons for that.
There are also important historical reasons for the prominence of "the criticism of religion" in turn-of-the-century thought, even though, as Marx noted, it had reached radical
conclusions sometime before. Over the course of the nineteenth century, Christianity
underwent an extraordinary self-critical review that struck at the heart of its authority and
quite possibly put all other authority at stake along with its own.17
In 1906 Albert Schweitzer published his famous Quest of the Historical jes11s. In it, he
summarizes and reflects on modern (mostly, but not exclusively, German) theology after
the catastrophic effort of modern historical method in its attempt to rebuild the Christian
faith in accordance with the results of modern historical investigation. The process
begins with the attempt to remove "mythical elements" from Christian doctrine. 18 Thus
miracles fare badly in the quest; indeed, Jesus's identity with the "supra-mundane Christ"
figures as nothing more than a "deception" invented by Greek early Christian theology.
Schweitzer's work depended on that unveiling: the dogma of the Dual Nature of Jesus
"had to be shattered before men could once more go out in quest of the historical Jesus"
(Schweitzer, 3). Ultimately, Schweitzer sees in this tradition both a destructive and a
constructive result:
Those who are fond of talking about negative theology can find their account here. There
is nothing more negative than the result of the critical study of the Life of Jesus.
The Jesus of Nazareth who came forward publicly as the Messiah, who preached the
ethic of the Kingdom of God, who founded the Kingdom of Heaven upon earth, and died
to give His work its final consecration, never had any existence. He is a figure designed by
rationalism, endowed with life by liberalism, and clothed by modern theology in an historical garb.
(Schweitzer. 398)

This conclusion, destructive as it is, makes possible the positive issue of the quest: "llut
the truth is, it is not Jesus as historically known, but Jesus as spiritually arisen within
men, who is significant for our time and can help it. Not the historical Jesus, but the spirit
which goes forth from Hirn and in the spirits of men strives for new influence and rule,
is that which overcomes the world" (401). And, although the modern world still does not
want this message, it is more needed than ever. Modern Christianity has become too
comfortable with the world, and too easily overlooks the imperatives of jesus's message.
Schweitzer concludes:
For that reason it is a good thing that the true historical Jesus should overthrow the modern
Jesus, should rise up against the modern spirit and send upon earth, not peace. but a sword.
He was not teacher, not a casuist; He was an imperious ruler. It was because I le was so in
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His inmost being that He could think of Himself as the Son of Man. That was only the
temporally conditioned expression of the fact that He was an authoritative ruler. The names
in which men expressed their recognition of Him as such, Messiah, Son of Man, Son of
God, have become for us historical parables. We can find no designation which expresses
what He is for us.
He comes to us as One unknown, without a name, as of old, by the lake-side, He came
to those men who knew Him not. He speaks to us the same word: "Follow thou me!" and
sets us to the tasks which He has to fulfill for our time. He commands. And to those who
obey Him, whether they be wise or simple, He will reveal Himselfin the toils, the conflicts,
the sufferings which they shall pass through in His fellowship, and, as in ineffable mystery,
they shall learn in their own experience Who He is.
(Schweitzer, 403)

I refer to Schweitzer's classic work for a few reasons. First, it shows that the purge of
"mythical elements" from Christian doctrine was part of a vital theological questioning
(the heart of modern liberal theology), and not only the work of a hostile, atheistic
debunking. Second, as a survey of developments, Schweitzer's text vividly demonstrates
the diffuse character of this questioning. The struggle within the modern, naturalistic
worldview for religious belief had been neither simply antagonistic nor small. (Together,
the first two points might suggest that theology could take active part in the modernism
I described earlier, with Cavell's and Pippin's help. Whether the Church could be part of
that modernism is another topic.) Third, for liberal theology-here again, Schweitzer is
exemplary-criticism's attack on the supramundane elements of the Gospel accounts of
Jesus's life turns out to be curiously beside the point. Theology's engagement with historical criticism yields (at least as Schweitzer sees it) only the conclusion that Jesus's truth
transcends historical fact. Christ's death and resurrection cease to be the founding of
which Arendt wrote-or, rather, they become challenges for the modern Christian, challenges to found or accept or affirm the kingdom here and now.
This historical criticis111 was alive and well in France too during the nineteenth century. The Revue Gernia11iq11e was a, if not the, chief forum for inquiry into historical
criticism and the principal conduit for German historical biblical criticism in France. It
featured long reviews of Ernest Renan and David Friedrich Strauss and original essays
on the challenges Christianity and Catholicism faced under modernity. 19 Renan's historical criticis111 had made a big impression

011

the French psyche from the midcentury.

Later writers in France, most notably Maurice 13londel, Alfred Loisy, and Lucien Laberthonnierc, advanced the cause of theological questioning that came to be called Catholic
modernism. It must be understood, though, that the three did not present themselves as
anything like a unified movement. In fact, "111odcrnism" as a coherent movement
emerged slowly and was never highly organized. The name itself is a largely retrospective
coinage, and the limits of its usefulness remain debatable. But that does not mean that
the thinkers we now associate with Catholic modernism didn't share significant common
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ideas or even that they didn't work together. Through the efforts of some determined
organizers, such as Baron Friedrich von Htigel, so-called modernists gradually came to
know one another and exchange ideas. But a (or the) defining moment of Catholic modernism was 1907, when Pope Saint Pius X's encyclicals appeared: Lcmimtabili sa11c cxitu
(published in July) and Pascencli clominici grcgis (published in September). In the first of
them the pope enumerated and condemned the errors of theological modernism; in the
second he offered a detailed analysis of modernism and condemned it as the "synthesis
of all heresies." Even after Pasccndi, many of the so-called modernists resisted the term
2

Pius applied to the movement and even denied that there was a movernent. 'l
Let's say, though, along with both Schweitzer and Pius X, that there is enough coherence among the theological currents named just above to justify speaking ofa movement
with common aims and ideas. Consider Schweitzer's conclusions, according to which
once doubtful doctrines have been debunked, what remains is not a Jesus Christ who has
a dual nature (human and divine), but two Jesuses: a historical Jesus and a divine Jesus,
who cannot be reconciled. Some researchers, seeing this, pass directly into atheism, having reached the conclusion that Jesus was just a man who tried to start a political or social
movement by appeal to existing Jewish scripture and tradition and that the divine Jesus
is a retrospective creation of the early Church, which is to say, a creation of some followers of Jesus who, determined to carry on after their leader's death, converted his political
objectives into an eschatological expectation. Some, like Renan, who decide to view Jesus
as nothing more than an admirable man nevertheless retain a distinctly religious notion
that approaches pantheism or syncretism. Others, like Schweitzer, reach the conclusion
that Jesus's words are a timeless message, which no fact about the life of the historical
Jesus can support or negate, because the message, which finds new form and expression
in all times and places, is the true and rightful object of our attention: "That He continues, notwithstanding, to reign as the alone Great and alone True in a world of which He
denied the continuance, is the prime example of that antithesis between spiritual and
natural truth which underlies all life and all events, and in Hirn emerges into the field of
history" (Schweitzer, 2).

AUTHORS AND AUTHORITY

Pippin, once again, offers a general account of the relevance to modernist art of problems
like those I have been discussing under the names "modernism" and "authority."

IL as

Pippin says, "[t]o be a modern individual is to demand independence; on the oIH' hand,
historical and intellectual 'maturity.' as Kant put it, a freedom from dependence on historical tradition and the power to rule one's own beliefs; 011 the other, social or existential
self.direction and autonomy" (Pippin, Moclrmism, 38), then the modern novel (Pippin's
prime example) is an extended development of certain doubts about the modern individual-not about particular individuals, such as Emma Bovary, but about individuals
who seek the kind of independence the modern mind requires:
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The novels all take a profound historical perspective; the fate of their characters is in some
way portrayed as a necessary fate. There is no language within modern self-understanding
for simply accepting the magnitude of their dependence on the utterly contingent mediation
of their desires by others. They must deceive themselves about it, promote their own false
independence, and so live lives of envy, self.hatred, and disillusion. What independence
there is, the independence of the artistic imagination, is often achieved at the price of a very
costly social "refusal," as in the modernist obsession with gamblers, outlaws, con men (all
figures of the ever alienated artist), those who try to act out or confirm their independence
from the mediation of others; or more typically, at the price of great loneliness and isolation,
in a way, at the price of the cessation of human desire, as in the later Marcel [of Proust's

A

la recliac/1e chi temps pm/11 (published 1913-27)], in his cork-lined room, Henry James's artist
characters (e.g. Ralph Touchett [of Portrait ofa Lady (1881)]), or Thomas Mann's paradigmatic
artist-figures, sick or even dying.
(Pippin, 39)

Marcel's experience of modernity costs him his faith in all "authorities in the world"leaving a void he fills in his "final aesthetic retreat" with "self-consciousness or reflection
(his claim to 'authority')" (Pippin, 42). Trading a social world for a private one, he replaces
external authority with the authority of self.knowledge or of understanding won by reflection. Works of modernist art can also challenge their readers or beholders directly, without the intervention of a model modern like Marcel. On Pippin's reading, Manet's Olym-

pia (1863; Musce d'Orsay, Paris) forces its beholders in effect to accept their independence
by denying the authority of established categories to inform an understanding of the
particularity of existence (36). Moreover, "the direct, unashamed gaze of the woman at
the viewer" apostrophizes the beholder, as if to ask: "And what, exactly, are you looking
for? What did you expect, those pink idealizations of classic paintings?" Hence "the classic canons and ideals" that were always previously sufficient to make sense of a nude "are
rejected, leaving, Manet already suggests, only the unredeemable particularity of modern
existence and the sheer materiality of the painting itself" (37). The woman and the painting, each liberated from its traditional "frame," challenge the authority of received ways
of encountering their kind (women, paintings) and pose new questions, about '"exchange
relations,"' "'free' contract between individuals, or of 'naked' power" (37). 21
In what follows, I enlarge on the matter Pippin raises, of a relation between modernity's refusal of extrinsic, received authority and modernist art's search for a way to
reestablish for itself a new authority.

THESIS AND HYPOTHESIS

It is time now to say more precisely what that authority might be, and what it might have
been for people working on the cusp of the twentieth century. I'll begin once again at an
earlier point in the history of what becomes modernism. Instead of Pius X, I'll begin with
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Pius IX, whose long pontificate, from 1846 to 1878, spanned the central years of a troubled
century in the French Church's history. The Concordat of 1801 had established the functional working relation of the French state to the Church that persisted through the
nineteenth century and right up to the period I'll be considering more deeply. But relations between France and the Church often came under strain. In the late 1840s, Pius
IX authorized a project that culminated in the encyclical Quanta cum-his famous Syllabus of Errors-which was sent to all bishops on December 8, 1864. The syllabus (I refer
to Pius !X's syllabus-not to Pius X's Lamentabili sane exitu) is, more or less, a list of
statements that the Church declared to be in error. From the moment it found its way
into the press, a large segment of modern European society felt itself to be on the wrong
side of the syllabus, which condemns encroachments by science, rationalism, socialism,
liberalism, religious tolerance, and the modern state on the doctrines, freedom, and
authority of the Church. Several countries, including France, forbade the Church to
publish the syllabus (without, it should be noted, forbidding the often anticlerical press
to interpret and criticize it).
The French government had special reason to resent the syllabus of 1864. Just a few
months before Pius IX sent it to the Church's bishops-indeed on September 15 of the
same year-France had reached an agreement with Victor Emmanuel I I, the Italian king,
to withdraw the French forces that had been assigned to protect the Vatican's sovereignty.
The Holy See and its sympathizers took this to be Napoleon Ill's way of canceling his
commitment to the Church and abandoning the Vatican to the shark-infested waters of
Italian unification. Many saw the syllabus as a counterattack against Napoleon Ill, a
reprisal for the agreement with Victor Emmanuel. In a sense, that is unjust. Since the
syllabus had been in preparation for about fifteen years, it can't simply be called a
response to Napoleon Ill's betrayal. Still, some saw it, or its timing, that way, and
although they may have been right about the timing, it is clear that the syllabus attacked
not only Napoleon III, but general trends in modern society (which Napoleon III could
nevertheless be said to epitomize).
One of the syllabus's points that played badly in France was its position on Church
teaching and temporal law under liberalism. The syllabus condemned the subordination
of Church teaching to temporal law-as in error 42: "In case of conflicting law enacted
by the two powers [Church and state], the civil law prevails." Consequently, many who
accepted the view of ascendant liberalism saw the syllabus as insisting that Catholics'
obedience to the Church could not accommodate the claims of the state, and therefore
as prohibiting faithful Catholics from living in a modern, liberal state.
Bishop Felix Dupanloup of Orleans sought to mitigate their predicament. Dupanloup
was an imposing figure in the public life of the French Church during the mid-nineteenth century. He was an educational reformer and campaigner who wrote on pedagogy
as well as on the place of religious institutions in the modern world, especially education.
Dupanloup played a curiously personal role in the early education of both Renan and
Paul Gauguin-a role so significant, in fact, that both felt it necessary later in life to
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reflect on it. Dupanloup also made an important and powerful response to the controversy the syllabus provoked in France. His Convention of the 15th September and the Encyc-

lic of the 8th December (La co11vention du 15 septembre et l'encyclique du 8 dicembre) takes on
the claim that the syllabus was a retort to the agreement between Napoleon III and Victor
Emmanuel-not by dissociating the two documents, but by insisting that they must be
seen together. He proposed that they be seen in juxtaposition, as illustrations of the
principles and (more to the point) the wisdom and integrity of the parties.
In his polemic, Dupanloup offers an adequate defense of the syllabus against the
accusation that it is sniping at Napoleon III, but he offers an ingenious argument against
anyone who aims to use the syllabus to force the question of the French Catholic's potentially conflicted obedience to Church and state. To the first point, Dupanloup points out
that the convention of September r5 permitted "two powerful sovereigns" to dispose of
a very small neighbor. "This is political." The encyclical of December 8, however, was
God's highest representative on Earth addressing all bishops around the globe. "This is
religious." Dupanloup sums up: "Politics and religion thus give to the world their measure. On one side, it must be confessed, is power; on the other grandeur.'' 12
In other words, Pius IX was not doing anything to anyone, nor was he even addressing
himself to those raising the cry. Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel, in contrast, were toying
with the fate of a sovereign nation and seemed, callously, to consider it no one's business
but their own what they might do with that little country. Their actions seem defensible
(no one was objecting to the convention-only to the encyclical) only insofar as we
understand that temporal power is both the tool and the justification of politics. The
Church shows in its conduct, by contrast, that ecclesiastical grandeur is both humbler
and loftier than the power of the state: the Church's territory is the very small country,
but its sovereign is justified by God, not by might, and he addresses himself to a whole
world, not just to another conniving ruler. Dupanloup's parsing of political and religious
authority exemplifies authority working out its thematic face-that is, establishing or
defining one authority in relation to another, so that their relation becomes a theme of
each authority's reflection on itsel( Thus, as Arendt points out, the Church and modern
revolutionary states compare themselves to Rome. Dupanloup, by defining the truths of
politics against those of religion, seeks to elevate religious truths and to associate political
truths with the coercive mechanisms of worldly power. Good as the argument may beit is surely open to criticism-Dupanloup docs his best work elsewhere.
Dupanloup concludes the little book by explaining just how the syllabus's remarks on
political liberty, which seem to make it impossible for a Catholic to live in a country
whose laws arc at odds with those of the Church, really do not put Catholics in an impossible conflict with civil authority. His point is elegant: "the Church is not enfeoffed by her
nature to any form of government"; rather, it "accepts all, provided they be just" (Dupanloup, Co11vmtio11 aHd E11c}'clic, 73; 137). Indeed, "[a]ll governments arc comparative and
imperfect," and members of the Church may choose freely from among all the available
forms of government (republics, monarchies, empires) (74; 138). That is the key: the
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members of the Church may choose their relative and imperfect government. They're
not affirming principles; they're navigating realities:
How, then, with so liberal a spirit, so large a constitution, could the Church be the enemy
of political liberty?
Do you speak of unlimited liberty? When and where in history have you met with this
chimera?
What are your own ideas ofliberty, allow me to ask? 21

Dupanloup answers the question himself:
You, yourselves, vociferous advocates for liberty, into what a strange forgetfulness oflibcrty
do you incessantly fall, in what regards us? [ ... ] I could here give you in detail [Jc pourrais
vous faire dire ici en detail] all the illiberal measures you have demanded or approved
against us. Understand, then, your own real position in the matter ofliberality.
Then you profess to be astonished that the Pope, when attacked, reviled, threatened
every day in the name ofliberty, turns against this word with a double meaning. St. Peter,
his immortal predecessor, also stigmatized this false liberty, which he termed vd,m1i:11

malitiae [a cloak for malice (r Peter 2:16)]! You arc surprised that, seeing the earth disturbed
by your experiments, he still lacks confidence, and you cry: "No, his principles are incom·
patiblewith ours, they are impracticable ... "Have yours ever been tested? Do yon proclaim
anything more than an ideal in the clouds? Arc you not forced, proud philosophers. to
accept the distinction which so shocks you with the theologians, the distinction between
thesis and hypothesis, theory and application?H

That's the key moment in Dupanloup's argument. The Church, having articulated in the
syllabus propositions that distinguish what is right from what is wrong, appears to put
its members in a predicament, because it is unimaginable how they might really, practi·
cally, live in France or Italy-or the United States, for that matter-without committing
either an error as enumerated in the syllabus or a crime as defined by the state.
But in reality, as Dupanloup saw it, the syllabus just tells the faithful the difference
between the principles the Church affirms and those it rejects. If the state c;111 espouse
liberalism and tolerance yet enact measures that restrict liberty (and show particularly
limited tolerance for the Church), then it is already itselfaflirming principles it docs not
practice. How can it blame the Catholics of France for living in the same predicament.
for living with the same difference between the principles they accept in theory (the
thesis) and those they find themselves able and compelled to live under (the hypothesis)?
Thus whereas the syllabus, for example, denounces the separation of Church and state,
the distinction between thesis and hypothesis, properly understood, shows how to rec·
oncile that absolute condemnation with real circumstances. The historian Marvi11
O'Connell offers a plainspoken paraphrase of Dupanloup's reasoning: "The separatioll
of church and state, while far from the ideal of complementary partnership betwcctl the
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secular and the sacred, is still better than a caesaropapism which reduces religion to a
governmental function." 2 ' So while affirming the ideal of Church involvement in temporal matters, Catholics could nevertheless live without contradiction or troubled conscience in a secular state as a condition of life and citizenship in the modern world.
Moreover-and as Dupanloup's defense shows-because no liberal state, however vociferously it advocates liberty ("liberte, egalite, fraternite," "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness"), actually ofiers complete liberty, or even aspires to do so, it is not only
Catholics who have to accept this condition: the secular liberal world also lives in what
Dupanloup calls the hypothesis rather than the thesis.

LIBERTY AND APOSTASY

Dupanloup was a famous compromiser. His careful leadership of dissenting elements
in the Church during the controversy over the doctrine of infallibility is an excellent
example. His career was marked from the beginning by his gift for diplomacy. Renan's
memoirs tell an unflattering but intriguing story of an episode that illustrates that gift.
They detail his early training under Doupanloup's personal tutelage and guidance-which
Renan considered decisive for own his intellectual development-but he also narrates
the turning point in Dupanloup's early career, since he sees it as the feat that won Dupanloup his first school. The story shows Dupanloup's political talents forcefully, if not flatteringly.
The decisive moment is the death of Prince de Talleyrand in 1838. (I tell the story here
as Renan does, without questioning its historical accuracy.) The prince, having decided
after a long, wicked career to effect a deathbed conversion and reconcile himself to the
Church-a "final lie" for the sake of"hu111an conventions"-had to find the right priest.
Renan sarcastically explains the delicate choice. Neither an old, hard-boiled priest, who
would demand too much, nor a young zealot, whom Talleyrand would have hated. The
ideal would be "a worldly priest, lettered, as little the philosopher as possible, not at all a
theologian, having with the old classes those relations of origin and society without
which the Gospel has little access in circles for which it was not made." 21' The young abbe
Felix Dupanloup is his choice. Dupanloup, in Renan's account, is a well-connected, literary- (rather than theologically) minded priest-someone suited "for a task of worldly tact
rather than of theology, in which it was necessary to know how to fool at once the world
and heaven." 27
Dupanloup surprises Talleyrand by being less compliant than the old prince anticipated. Talleyrand, determined to wait for the last minute, stalls until the morning of his
last day to capitulate: ·The anguish was extreme. One knows the importance Catholics
attach to the moment of death. Iffi1turc rewards and punishments have some reality, it
is clear that these rewards and punishments should be set in proportion to a whole life
of virtue or vice. The Catholic doesn't understand it that way. A good death makes up
for everything." 2x This from the former seminarian who mocks Dupanloup for lacking
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seriousness about theology. (As we'll see, Apollinaire's tale of a deathbed conversion
offers a similarly ironic take on strategic absolution.)
Dupanloup waits in the next room while Talleyrand entertains his reservations.
Finally, the prince sends for the priest and signs his name, sealing the pact that reconciles him with the Church. The event, in Renan's account, is Dupanloup's making.
Dupanloup is offered positions and honors and money, Renan says, and takes the money,
not for himself-Renan insists that Dupanloup is perfectly disinterested where his personal fortunes are concerned-but to launch his plan to spread propaganda by
"]'education classique et religieuse" (Renan, 163).
Thus begins Dupanloup's adventure as the head of the seminary school of SaintNicolas-du-Chardonnet. Saint-Nicolas had been a seminary, engaged exclusively in the
education of clergy, but Dupanloup, once he was placed in charge of it, aimed to transform it into a force in education by recruiting students, regardless of their vocation, from
among the aristocracy and the most talented young scholars in all France (Renan, 16768). (Coincidentally, the parish church ofSaint-Nicolas-du-Chardonnet was seized by the
radical right-wing traditionalist [or "integriste"] Fraternite sacerdotale Saint-Pie-X on February 27, 1977.)
That's how Renan, a smart student in a small Breton town, entered Dupanloup's fold.
His summons to attend Dupanloup's Saint-Nicolas saved him from a career as a provincial cleric (Renan, 157-58). After leaving Saint-Nicolas, Renan entered the seminary
school at Saint-Sulpice, which was just the opposite of Saint-Nicolas. Whereas Dupanloup's curriculum emphasized literature at the expense of theology and philosophy,
Saint-Sulpice founded its educational mission on theology:
Saint-Sulpice taught me first to consider as childishness all that M. Dupanloup had taught
me to cherish most. What is simpler? If Christianity is a revealed thing, is not the capital
occupation of the Christian the study of that very revelation, which is to say theology?
Theology and the study of the Bible came soon to absorb me, to give me the true reasons
to believe in Christianity and also the true reasons not to adhere to it. For four years, a
terrible struggle occupied all of me, until this word, which I repulsed for a long time as a
diabolical obsession: "That is not true!" tried again and again at my interior car with an
invincible persistence. 29

The result of that inner struggle was Renan's contribution to the historical biblical
criticism Schweitzer discussed, his influential Vii: di: jisus (Life; of}ems) and other writings. The character of that struggle is important, too: Renan struggled against the institution that was instructing him but was not, he states emphatically enough, in rebellion
against it. As his reference to the voice in his car suggests, the struggle was fought within
himself, adjudicated by his own love of right. Renan makes a point of this:
As for me, I don't think that in any period of my life I have obeyed; yes, I've been docile,
submissive, but to an intellectual principle, never to a material force proceeding from the
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fear of punishment. My mother never ordered me to do anything. Between me and my
ecclesiastical masters all was free and spontaneous. Whoever has known this rationabile
obsequiun1 [reasonable service] could no longer tolerate any other. An order is a humiliation;
whoever has obeyed is capitis minor [diminished in respect of citizen rights], sullied in the
germ of the noble life. Ecclesiastical obedience does not degrade; because it is voluntary,
and one may separate oneself: 30

Renan is like a priest in that his obedience is spontaneous, not a response to coercion.
By this he means that priests are in principle free, because what they believe it right to
do must be in agreement with what they are required to do. Renan paints a picture of a
perfect liberty within a perfect authority. It's also a perfect excuse for his apostasy-as if
the Church, to reproach him for renouncing his faith, would have to pretend that it was
acceptable for priests to profess faith even if they had none. Authority, to remain legitimate, needs to be in accord with liberty. We might even say: for authority to rescue
itself from a reduction, such as Benda performs, into "theocratic" and "physiocratic"
authorities-which are not really credible authorities at all but different species of
coercion-it must ground itself in truth. The Church must respect, then, the conclusions
of the individual theologian's sincere pursuit of truth, even if they lead him into apostasy.
Recall that Dupanloup also wrote about authority in his apology for Pius IX's syllabus.
And he reached conclusions very different from Renan's, so that he remained within the
Church whereas Renan regarded the Church as an obstacle to the truth. But Dupanloup
offered no conflicting definition of authority. Indeed, he wrote about authority on other
occasions and to reconcile it with liberty in ways that show that a shared notion of authority underlay his view and Renan's. For example, in his Premiere lettre cl M. le Due de Broglie
(1844), Dupanloup writes:
Yes, Catholicism has the spirit of liberty, just as it has the spirit of authority.
Uut it must be understood: liberty for good, liberty for truth, liberty for virtue: there is
the true force of humanity, there is its conquering force, its creative force: nothing is more
brilliant, nothing is more fecund.
True authority, legitimate liberty should always be allied, never at war.
There is no right against right. 11

Of course, people arc fallible and often lapse into the false liberty that is not in harmony with authority. Herc true authority helps, according to Dupanloup-"divine authority itself profoundly respects our liberty." 12 "Christianity and evangelical grace" work
together as a force to "free man from his fetters, from the tyrannical violences that oppress
him, that constrain him, that diminish his liberty." 31 Legitimate liberty is the liberty to do
what is right. When tyrants (such as the French government), who seek to deprive the
public of true liberty, combine their attack with the seductions of a false liberty, which is
really license, the result is a great difliculty (Dupanloup, "La Libert<.\" 256). Dupanloup
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sounds like Renan. (Or rather, Renan, for all the disdain he heaps on Dupanloup as a
philosopher, offers the same account ofliberty and authority that Dupanloup docs.)
Dupanloup spells out the relation between authority and writing, too. In his book on
education (De /'education), he defines authority in a way that especially interests me
because it brings the issue of authority into direct contact with the work of authorship:

Authority: in Latin auctoritas, comes from the noun auctor, author, creator. The word
itself comes from agae, augae, which indicates the power of action and sometimes a creative action.
But in human thought, what is the author? The author is he who creates, who produces
a thing.
The dictionary of the Academy, too, says: Author, he who is tlze first c,rnsi: of something.
There is the idea itself, the simple idea, the essential idea that this name presents.
This name suits God eminently as author, as the first cause of all things. One also says:
God is the author of the universe: the author of nature; th.: author of all that i:xists.
One says of a father: That's the author of my days; of an illustrious ancestor: that's ti1c

author of my race.
In literature, an author is he who has made a book: nothing is more commonly repeated.
He is the author of this book; this book is his work.
An artist is also the author of the picture he has painted, of the statue he has sculpted.
A legislator is the author of a law he has made: thus one says: Lyrnrgm is ti1e ,111ti1or of

Lacedemonicm law.
The author is thus always he who creates, who produces, who invents, who establishes,
who institutes something.3-1

Dupanloup gives the same account of authority-as-founding that Arendt offered. But he
emphasizes its connection with authorship. Dupanloup's view of authority is a literary
one, or at least his view of authority owes its origin and its nature as much to the relation
between author and work and reader and work as it docs to any other paradigm-that is,
he does not think of authority as a police force or a court of Jaw. It can be paternal or it
can be legal, but his idea of authority is at least equally the relation of a poet to his poem
and of a painter to his painting. He concludes with the point I would underscore:
Authority is the natural right of an author over his work.
Indeed, it is said to be the right to command, and to this right corresponds the duty to
obey. 33

You may write to compel others, but that prerogative also entails the duty to accept the
consequences of what you write. Authority is meaningless without obedience. /\gain, this
statement is consistent with Rcnan's and Dupanloup's accounts of the relation of'lilwrty
to authority, seen, as it were, from the reverse angle: We have seen that the seminarian's
obedience is not submission to another's commands but rather assent to the truth. If you
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are the one who claims to say what is true, however, your assent is implied and you are
obliged to live in conformity with it. Your authority is at stake. Authority is not the power
to issue arbitrary commands; rather, it entails joining with those under one's authority
in submission to the truth one proclaims (and the imperatives or injunctions that follow
from it). This is what I call the ethical face of the problem of authority: living out the
implications of what one proclaims with authority. If I tell my children that they must
eat a healthy diet but do so from behind my nightly platter of poutine, I lose authority in
their eyes-because my behavior indicates to them that I don't know what a healthy diet
is or do not take my own pronouncement seriously enough to obey it.

REVELATION AND GOSSIP

Soren Kierkegaard makes the point forcefully. T/ir; IJook on Ad/a is Kierkegaard's study
of Pastor Adolph Peter Adler, a theologian and preacher who claimed to have received a
revelation and then withdrew his claim, or qualified it. saying that he was uncertain
whether he had received a revelation. Adler is an exemplary figure for Kierkegaard because
his uncertainty about the revelation embodies the confusion of an age that as Kierkegaard
put it, has forgotten authority. ir,
In T/Je IJook

011

Ac//i;r, however, Kierkegaard also writes about writing and different

kinds of writing. He advances a distinction between what he calls premise-authors and
genuine authors and repeatedly opposes works that reach conclusions and are genuine,
on the one hand, to the chatter of newspapers, on the othcr.37 These remarks on writing,
arc also comments 011 ways of!iving-they arc not separate from the problems of revelation and authority that are Kierkegaard's main theme. Nor arc they distinct from the
problem of authority in writing as Dupanloup, for example, presents it. The book's introduction begins by calling its age, "according to what the barber says," an "age of movement." Kierkegaard supposes therefore the likelihood that many people "have premises
for living but do not arrive at any conclusion" and in this, they arc like their age (Kierkegaard, 7).
Newspapers emblematize the needy incompleteness of those who generate premises
rather than conclusions. Modernity's understanding of itself is the stuff of barbers' and
newspapers' gossip. Revelation is more diffirnlt under such cirrnmstanccs-not because
of modernity's scientific, naturalistic spirit nor because of the historical investigation
Schweitzer traces, but rather because of modernity's chatter, because of its newspapers,
and because of the relation to one's own experience that such forums as chatter and
newspapers produce. It was not always thus-"in those distant times when a man was
vouchsafed lofty revelations, he used a long time to understand himself in this marvel
before he began to want to guide others." Our age is diflerent, though:
Now, however, irrnncdiatcly the lll'Xt morning one puts in the newspaper that one had a
revl'lation last night. Perhaps one fears that the quiet solitary reflection (on what in the
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most extreme sense might very well alter a person's whole existence even ifhe never mentioned it to anyone) would lead one to the humbling but rescuing insight that it was an
illusion, so one would drop the whole matter and would seek to become reconciled with
God with respect to it, so one on lesser terms would truly become a teacher who knew how
to teach others and to hold the highest infinitely in honor.
(Kierkegaard,

22-2 3)

Putting your revelation in the newspaper the morning after receiving it is not a way
of disseminating it; it's a way of evading it. You publish your revelation experience but
wait for the public to tell you how to take it, as fact or delusion, as a drearn or a call. The
prophet who publishes his revelation in the newspaper, as premise rather than conclusion, "wants to convert his call from God into a call from public opinion" (Kierkegaard,

25). (Dupanloup might say you were neither exercising the author's right to command
nor honoring the author's duty to obey. Renan might say you had chosen mere obedience
over the love of truth, over the diabolical or divine word that assaults your inward ear.)
Keeping it to yourself until you are sure of yourself, sure enough of it to let it change your
life-that would be the response of a true prophet, one who had not forgotten the meaning of authority and who wanted to speak with authority.
In the modern age, however, the forgetting of that meaning is widespread. That is why
Adler is exemplary rather than simply extraordinary. Adler was eventually suspended by
the Danish church-not because his revelation was false but rather because he was
judged mentally unfit, a judgment that shows the Danish church no longer able or willing to appeal to its own authority to tell true doctrine from heresy. (Otherwise, the church
would presumably have declared Adler a heretic or a prophet.) The church

110

longer

asserted-that is to say, it had forgotten-its authority. Indeed the modern Christian,
accustomed to pondering the miracles of two thousand years ago, experiences in doing
so a task that differs greatly from facing a contemporary irruption of the supernatural in
the natural world. Believing that Christ changed water into wine two thousand years ago
is easy compared with taking seriously someone in the flesh who claims to have witnessed the same thing only yesterday (Kierkegaard, 4Gff).
To sum up: authority (as opposed to coercion, worldly power) flows from truth. Whatever matter that truth addresses, it always also means that the figure asserting the authority knows himself and understands himself in his relationship to the truth. The modern
search for truth in historical criticism, at the expense of the Church's authority, sets the
stage for a crisis. The Church's assertion of authority becomes problematic. 1n the process, however, historical method loses its own authority. (It can establish facts for us, but
not compel us. That is what Schweitzer announced in 1906: now that we have the facts
about the historical Jesus, we can see that we need the divine one instead.) If neither
doctrine nor historical research can underwrite the authority we need, how shall we
ground it? Further, we have seen a crisis in what it means to possess authority. Authority
means acting on the truth, both professing it and embracing the imperatives that follow

36

"~ H yp O C R I r E

L EC

r Eu R'

... M O

ri '

EM

uL A uL E'

- M O IJ

f R [ R E ..

from it. In order to recognize or submit to authority, one must acknowledge its truth and
acknowledge that its truth is also a truth about oneself (about what one must do, become,
admit, proclaim) and, finally, one must embrace and be compelled by that truth, whether
one asserts authority or recognizes the authority of another. One participates in-one
gains-authority by submitting to genuine authority. This is the ethical face of the problem of authority. Authority poses two challenges: first, establishing authority by gaining
a clear relation to a truth; second, establishing authority by living the consequences of
the truth. Thus freedom is only the freedom to obey true authority (the freedom to act
on the truth); freedom turned to any other purpose is merely license (or, to phrase the
same idea differently, submission to some coercion).
As both Dupanloup and Kierkegaard make clear, authority is not a problem only for
the Church (or a church). furthermore, even someone (like Renan) who rejects the divinity ofJesus still faces the problem of authority. It is a problem that belongs to writing in
general-even to representation in general. It is probably no surprise, then, that I claim
the poets and painters that I discuss engage the problem of authority in their works.

POETS AND DESPOTS

To clarify my point in relation to artistic representations and to begin closing in on the
figures with whose works my argument is most centrally occupied, I go to the headwaters
of symbolist poetry, with a few remarks about Baudelaire's "Au lecteur," in which I follow
very loosely an argument of Ross Chambers'. 38 The poem, which opens Baudelaire's Les
Flrnrs dit Mal, is about the relationship between the figure Chambers describes as an
"Oriental despot"-whose identity is unclear or shifting-and the victims of his repressive violence. The poem embodies the idea of despotic rule in different persons: in the
figure of"Satan Trismegiste," or "le Diable," who "vaporizes" "the rich metal ofour will"
and "holds the strings that move us," and in the personification of"Ennui," which "dreams
of scaffolds as it smokes its houka."
As the title of the poem implies, "Au lecteur" also takes up its relationship to its
reader as a central theme. The poem's famous ending, "-Hypocrite lecteur, -mon
semblablc, -rnon frere!" makes clear that the stance the poem assumes toward the
reader includes both kinship or similarity (swiblable,ji·en:) and a posture of denunciation

(liypocritr-). The cruelty, one might even say violcnce, of the denunciation places the subject of the poem and the reader in a relationship of domination that bears comparison to
the dominion of the despotic figures of Satan and Boredom the poem names and narrates. Chambers explains:
What founds the similarity between text and reader, then, in the final analysis, is at the
level of what in the reader is concealed (including concealed from the reader himself) but in
the text is laid bare; and what defines the comn11micational relationship between text and
reader, and establishes the necessary difkrence without which the act of communication
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would be pointless, is the act of denunciation which positions speaker and addressee, respectively, as subject and object of a symbolic act of cruelty, the denunciatory stripping away of
that concealment. There is an Oriental despot in the reader and an Oriental despot in the
text, and in one sense it is the selfsame despot, the houka-srnoking, gallows-dreaming victim
of Ennui. But, of the two, the Oriental despot in the text lays claim to being stronger and
crueler, since by denunciation he forces acknowledgement, that is dis-covery of the Oriental
despot in the reader ("Tu le connais, lecteur!"), while retaining in some degree his own "cover."
(Chambers, 104-5)

The text pictures repressive, despotic figures, but also exercises a cruel, even despotic
authority over the reader. And that despotic authority grows from the knowledge the
despot in the text has and proclaims of himseij·and of the reader. That is to say, the text's
despotism is not coercion, but real authority.
There are differences between the despots of Satan and Boredom and the despot in
the poem's voice. Satan and Boredom vaporize the will, lure the reader into hell by lassitude and self-deception. But the subject who speaks in the text calls the reader to
acknowledgment. He sounds the alarm. Moreover, rather than seduce the reader, as
Satan and Boredom do, the subject of the poem speaks to the reader, at first as his double
(using the first-person plural); then, having established his claim to know the same vices
and weaknesses, to have been dominated by the same despots, the poem's subject
abruptly confronts the reader personally and directly (and notably in the familiar form of
the second-person singular). This shift gives the voice of the text the superiority Chambers notes. 39 It also forces the reader to assent and accept the denunciation or else to deny
being the reader the text addresses (Chambers, 104).
A strikingly similar theme is at work in Apollinaire's "Zone," which begins with a
curious piece of theology:
You are tired at last of this old world
0 shepherd Eiffel Tower the flock of bridges bleats at the morning
You have had enough oflife in this Greek and Roman antiquity
Even the automobiles here seem to be ancient
Religion alone has remained entirely fresh religion
Has remained simple like the hangars at the airfield
You [tu] alone in all Europe are not antique O Christian faith
The most modern European is you [vous] Pope Pius X
And you [tu] whom the windows look down at shame prevents you [t,:]
From entering a church and confessing [t'y co11J;:s,a] this morning
You [Tu] read prospectuses catalogues and posters which shout aloud
Here is poetry this morning and for prose there are the newspapers
There are volumes for 25 centimes Ii.ill of detective stories
Portraits of famous men and a thousand titles'"
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Apollinaire's reference to Pius X seems key to understanding the opposition between old
and modern and how it works. Pius is, after all, "the most modern European," even though
Apollinaire is being ironic when he calls Pius X that. Pius cuts a conservative figure in the
popular understanding of recent Church histo1y; indeed, it was he who had elevated the
notion of modernism to broad intellectual currency by denouncing it and suppressing it in

1907. I say Apollinaire is being ironic, though, not nonsensical. I suppose what he means
is that by insisting, against certain conclusions of liberal theolo 6,y, that New Testament
miracles like the Ascension are real rather than mythological (to borrow a term from liberal
theology), Pius makes Jesus's acts directly comparable to those oflatter-day aviators. 41 And
so Apollinaire portrays Jesus as the first and greatest aviator: "C'est le Christ qui monte au
cicl mieux que !cs aviateurs / II detient le record du monde pour la hauteur" (9). Catholicism's technology, under Pius X, has remained ahead of the latest breakthroughs in aviation.
Further, its insistence on a literal understanding of the Ascension permits Apollinaire to
regard it, not as a historical claim at a comfortable distance, but from the viewpoint of
contemporaneity that Kierkegaard commended to the modern Christian.
The difference between aviation and the Ascension is that one is part of man's increasing control over the natural order-a distinctive feature of modernity-whereas the other
is supernatural, the intrusion of the divine into the worldly, whose untroubled acceptance
can be seen as a feature of a prcmodern mode. One thing that theological modernism,
at least, can do, however, is collapse the two into a single order, either by "demythologizing" Christian doctrine-purging religious faith of whatever is at odds with modern
standards of plausibility-or by proposing to see the divine as immanent in the natural
world generally (a viewpoint that can verge on pantheism), or by doing both.
Another feature of "Zone" seems to be a nod to theological modernism: As Christ flies
into the sky, he is followed by an assortment of personages and creatures, many of them
of mythological or biblical provenance: devils, angels, "lea re Enoch Elie Apollonius de
Thyanc," and birds (some of them mythological or associated with the sacred) from different parts of the world. The motley mythological array suggests syncretism-Christ
leads a troop that represents not only nature but also different religious or mythological
traditions, implying that Christ coexists with them and that they regard Christ as a peer.
12

Despite Christ's primacy among the flying host, not all of them respect Him: The devils describe I lim as having stolen the idea of flying from Simon Magus: "Ils disent qu'il
imitc Simon Mage en )udee / !ls crient s'il sait voler qu'on l'appellc voleur" (9). Christ's
miracles-that I le knows how to fly (vola)-arc borrowed from earlier religious traditions; that is, they make him a thief (volc11r). This strikes me as Apollinaire's characteristically witty way of paraphrasing a syncrctic view of Christianity-his Christianity gives
specific form to univers;il ideas. In eflect. then, it "steals" a universal truth. The idea that
all religions arc versions of a single truth is another key feature of theological modernism. (It is also arguably modernist in the sense that Pippin, for instance, explained. This
syncrctic impulse can express a desire to free religious feeling from dependence on the
perspective one owes to one's particular, limited, contingent religious tradition.)\!
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The modernist collapses I have just noted-of miracle into nature and of Christianity
into syncretism-mirror another collapse with deep roots in symbolist aesthetics. Just as
the narrator sees the supernatural and the natural worlds together (as Christ flies
with the aviators), so he sees poetry and the language of newspapers and billboards
together, as members of the same order. The narrator begins reading posters for poetry
and newspapers for prose. The tension between literature (poetry, prose in the artistic
sense) and the language of the modern poster and popular periodical has-and had
when Apollinaire wrote "Zone"-quite a pedigree. (Mallarmc is the most famous case of
a major figure of modernist literature expressing an ambivalent relation to the popular
press. 4·1 And his case is unquestionably relevant to our understanding of members of the

bande aPicasso, such as Apollinaire.) One can think of Apollinaire as launching an attack
on the high-art status of poetry, on behalf of the "low" media of journalism and advertising.4' Another way to see it-or possibly, another way to describe the same thing-is as
a poetic pantheism, in which every utterance is available to poetry.
Hans Robert Jauss's view of "Zone" unites Apollinaire's excitement about modernity
with its cost: the excitement of modernity comes at the price of alienation from himself:
from his voice: "Admittedly, theflaneur in Zone is everywhere able, on his walk through
Paris, to discover and praise the poetry of technology and the beauty of 'industrial art.'
Yet to the extent that he succumbs to the fascination of the metropolis-from the early
morning of the working masses to the stale nightly pleasures of the poor-he must also
undergo the experience of having his own self elude him, even as he seeks, in both the

'I' and the 'You' of his changing voices, to call it to account." 11' Jauss's point is that Apollinaire's "vers libre" and "new aesthetic of simultaneity, of continuous fragmentation and
amimetic montage," put the reader in a difficult position: "Since the occasion detennining the kaleidoscopically changing foci of the poem remains hidden from the reader, he
is now a 'third person,' in the role of an alien, as it were, for whom the event evoked is
entirely unfamiliar" (Jauss, 43). Thus Apollinaire has set the reader an unusual task: "he
must now constantly produce for himself hypotheses of meaning, and reorder the irritating actuality of the text in everchanging arrangements" (Jauss,

"1912,"

43). This is a mat-

ter, not just of suppressing the usual forms of narrative or descriptive coherence, but also
of calling forth a different kind of reader:

It requires [ ... ] that the reader abandon the conventional contemplative focus and become
productive himself. reconstructing a modern experience of the whole through the destruction of his usual expectations. A reconstruction, that is, of the aesthetic idea of the world
that makes the immemorially old recognizable once more in the absolutely new. In the
discontinuous lyrical movement of Zone, and in the praise of the unprecedented ascendency of modernity-in which is inscribed, as a countercurrent, the experiences of the
dismembered, alienated self-the contradiction between the initial vision and the closing
image can remain unresolved.
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The initial vision to which Jauss refers is that of the soaring Christ, and the closing
image, the encounter the narrator describes "after a night of carousing, seeking sleep
among his oceanic fetishes, [where] there appears to him, instead of the modern Christ
in the utopian form of a flyer, an unrecognized god dismembered into a great multitude"
(Jauss, "1912," 42). Rather than a reader who receives an aesthetic world as a whole image
transmitted by an author's poetic labor, Jauss describes one who assembles a simultaneous polyphony of images and thereby makes the poetic world immediate and, indeed,
modern. The two figures of deity Jauss mentions-the modern Christ and the "inferior
Christs"-represent, as I understand Jauss to say, an optimistic embrace of modernity,
on the one hand, and the price one pays, "the lyrical Ts' loss of its own self" (Jauss, 42),
on the other.
This trade-off-in which modernity exchanges objective intelligibility, underwritten,
as it were, by the poet's authority, for an immediacy of personal experience, leaving to the
reader the task of establishing the authority of a reading-strikes me as a central issue in
"Zone." Its relation to the poem's religious/sacrilegious thematics seems no less important. If! differ from Jauss in matters I've been reviewing, it is on the reader's place in this
unusual and modern kind of poetry. Jauss sees "Zone" as part (and the more radical
"Lundi rue Christine" as a more advanced part) of the history of modernism, specifically,
its move to "free aesthetic reception from its contemplative passivity by involving the
reader, the observer, or onlooker himself in the concretization of the aesthetic object. He
becomes, after a fashion, a fellow creator of the work, and as such abandons the classical
illusion par excellence of an expectation of a closed form filled with meaning, and understands that the foundation of meaning in interpretation, like artistic activity itself, is
always only a possible development of an intenninable task" (Jauss, "1912," 62).
I have to disagree. I return later to the problems Jauss raises. But for now, one way to
express that disagreement (not the only way or even the most categorical) is to suggest
that the "I's" alienation from itself also functions to provide "cover" (as Chambers might
say) for the poem's voice to confront the reader with its authority.
Consider, for instance, the "tu" the narrator addresses (as opposed to the "vous" he
uses, appropriately enough, for Pius X), who is on the horns of a dilemma:
Et toi que !es fem·tres observent la honte le retient
D'entrer dans 1111e eglise ct de t'y con lesser cc ma tin
The "you," before he is drawn to the call of the posters and newspapers, finds himself
torn between shame and the desire to reconcile himself with the Church. To pass a church
that way is to be in the grip of faith-to feel sufficiently drawn to the confessional to feel
held back from it. ;\nd to refuse the call of the confessional is different from simply not
having faith.
The "you" the narrator addresses f<.,cls like a puzzle at first. 17 There is a "tu" in the
third line of the poem, but one may read that (incorrectly) as referring to the Eiffel-tower-

r..1 ()

[J

f I~ t~ I --,

t., )

/1.,

r~

0

,\

lj

T HO~ I T l E s

41

as-shepherdess, and another in the seventh, which may refer to Christianity. Pius X is
"vous." So the "toi" in the ninth line-should that be read as addressing and as referring
to the reader? As if Apollinaire were telling me about me? Not clearly: the matter gets a
little complicated over the course of the next stanza or so, but it comes to seem that the
narrator is doing something like talking to himself about himself. In fact, the narrator
comes likewise to be identifiable with Apollinaire himself, since the poem refers autobiographically to "le plus ancien <le tes camara<les Rene Dalize" (8).
My interest in this particular passage, though, combines the "tu'"s failure to answer
the call to confession, which he hears but cannot obey, with the use of the second person
(even more, of the second-person familiar), which transforms the description of this
ambivalent response into a confrontation: it is at once a claim about what the "tu" is feeling and an accusation (that the "tu" resists the call because of shame, which is hardly a
legitimate reason). Indeed, the two lines in question amplify the sense of confrontation.
The windows observe "you." Shame, too, suggests a self.conscious awareness of how one
must (or might) seem to another (a confessor, God, oneself in a reflective or self critical
mood). Ultimately, if we decide that the "tu" who feels the ambivalent attraction to the
confessional is also the (autobiographical) narrator, that decision won't undermine the
sense that using the second person creates a confrontational mood; it will only dramatize
what we all already know: that you can confront yourself. As such, I take Apollinaire's "tu"
to be in some sense, at least, an apostrophe to the reader (even if he then "reveals" it to
be his voice addressing itself). Just like the closing of Baudelaire's "Au lecteur," "Zone'"s
"tu" demands (again: even if it appears almost immediately to rescind the dernand) that
you either acknowledge its claim (that you are held back from the confessional by shame)
or admit that you aren't the poem's reader.
This use of the second person, and other, similar techniques for addressing (or, as I
say, apostrophizing) 48 the reader, especially when such techniques mean confronting the
addressee with a call to reform (like the call to the confessional) or with the addressee's
failure to heed a call-this is one of the themes I point to in the work by Picasso and the
poets closest to him. It is a way a poem can assert authority. In what follows, I explain
the place of the problem of authority in poetry and painting, too, around Picasso and
Apollinaire in the early years of the twentieth century.
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